Safety-bypass susceptibility of Gemini Robotics-ER 2 is predictable by a local open-source proxy VLM without querying the target
Auto-published from arXiv:2609.38971 by the mine-arxiv pipeline. Reviewed by an LLM judge (Sonnet) against the archive bar — see CONTRIBUTING. Notes: cleared review (confidence 0.83, flags: [possible-zero-day])
Category
alignment
Model
Gemini Robotics-ER 2 (target); Qwen3-VL-30B (proxy predictor)
Surface
API (VLM planner)
Setup
For each of the 846 refused tasks, a composite signal (A5) is computed using Qwen3-VL-30B across four probes—trace ambiguity, perturbation spread, constitution reliance, and decoding instability—none of which require querying the target model. The composite is used to rank tasks by predicted malleability (likelihood of refusal bypass by object insertion) before any bypass is attempted.
Reproduction anchor
code: https://github.com/mdctleo/refusal-bend; benchmark: EARBench 846-task refused split; LatentHarm dataset (281 tasks, released with code)
Observed behavior
Qwen3-VL-30B composite achieves ROC-AUC 0.785 and identifies malleable tasks 2.4× more often than random selection. High-malleability tasks share the property that the hazard is not conspicuous in the instruction or scene—it emerges only from the instruction-scene interaction.
Expected behavior
Susceptibility to bypass should not be reliably predictable without querying the target model; an attacker should not be able to cheaply pre-screen which tasks are vulnerable.
Reproducibility
medium
Threat model
An attacker runs a local open-source VLM to pre-screen a deployed robot's task queue, identifying vulnerable tasks before interacting with the target system, then selectively rearranges the physical environment only for those tasks. Defensively, the same signal allows operators to assess per-task malleability prior to deployment and add task-specific guardrails.
Novelty
Establishes that safety-bypass susceptibility ('malleability') is an intrinsic, predictable property of task specification—not stochastic model behavior—enabling both proactive defense and systematic attacker pre-screening via a cheap open-source proxy without target model access.
Source
- arXiv: 2609.38971
- PDF: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2609.38971
- Categories: cs.CR, cs.RO
- Authors: Leo Y. Lin, Mikhail Kuznetsov, Muslum Ozgur Ozmen, Z. Berkay Celik
Triage notes (auto)
- paperType:
red-team-vuln - estimatedCaseCount: 3
- triage reason: Systematic red-teaming of embodied VLM planners: demonstrates that 20.2% of safety-refused tasks can be bypassed by adding ordinary objects to the environment, with reproducible setup and predictive model identifying vulnerable tasks. No disclosed vendor coordination.
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